Balkanizer

International community’s options for BiH

June 29th, 2007 by vanja

International Community’s Options for Bosnia and Herzegovina

This time last year, Mr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling - the High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) – announced his goal to close down the Office of the High Representative (OHR) by June of 2007. His plan was actually to radically transform this office into the EU Special Envoy, thus drastically reducing the executive powers that the OHR currently enjoys. Those powers – called the Bonn Powers – were the key instrument in passing some of the country’s most important legislation and removing certain individuals from the position of power. Under Schwarz-Schilling’s plan, the future EU Special Envoy’s job will not include such powers. In fact, the position would be merely advisory – to help guide Bosnia and Herzegovina toward EU and NATO membership. Luckily, that plan failed. OHR as an institution has been extended until June 2008 and most likely be extended beyond that date. The post will be filled by Miroslav Lajcak – a young and energetic Slovakian diplomat with experience of working with transitioning societies in both his country and in Serbia and Montenegro. He supplemented that experience with a tour in Japan as Slovakian ambassador. His early statements point that he, unlike his predecessor, will take an aggressively proactive role, relying on the Bonn Powers if necessary, to put BH back on the reform direction. In today newspapers (Dnevni Avaz, 29 JUN 2007), he correctly stated that the current BH Constitution is a product of war and should be radically replaced. For the fans of the radical and meaningful reforms to BH Constitution, Lajcak’s statements are very encouraging, indeed.

On the other hand, the Bosnian Serb leadership had repeatedly hailed the planned decrease in international involvement in BH’s domestic affairs, as stated by Mr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling last year. Most vocal champion of this idea is the current Prime Minister of Republika Srpska – Milorad Dodik. Although he is the leader of a nominally Independent Social-Democrat party (SNSD), Dodik has been pushing a radical Serb nationalist agenda since reaching an agreement with the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) - that has ruled Republika Srpska since the first post-war elections - on rising to the position of Prime Minister.

In the past, Dodik’s party was viewed as a civic alternative to the nationalist SDS and SRS (Serb Radical) parties. During a brief rise to power following the 2000 elections, SDS viewed SNSD as more than a political opponent. In fact, internal SDS documents showed an open distaste for Dodik and his party. Such views were frequently promoted in public speeches by the SDS leaders that often portrayed SNSD as traitors of the Serb cause in Bosnia, and American lackeys.

Those differences were obviously bridged when the Serb entity was presented with a set of reforms that would make Bosnia and Herzegovina eligible for membership in EU and NATO. This development forced the Bosnian Serb leadership to formulate such a strategy that would not oppose BH’s strategic goal of becoming a member of these two organizations as a further legitimization of the Bosnian state, but would preserve the Republika Srpska’s state-like autonomy within the BH state in its present form.

Serving Secessionism by Opposing Reforms and Integration in EU and NATO

The result of such a strategy is Dodik’s willingness to negotiate reforms as part of the supposedly common goal with Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats of creating preconditions of joining EU and NATO, but stalling or obstructing any meaningful reforms that would ensure Bosnia’s future as a single state within a European framework. Dodik is placing such obstructions under the guise of the Dayton Peace Agreement that had formulated the BH state as a union of two entities – Republika Srpska and the Federation (Bosniak-Croat). Dodik has repeatedly stated that he does not oppose reforms as long as the Dayton-guaranteed autonomy for Republika Srpska is not violated.

The problem with this strategy is that there cannot be meaningful reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina if the subject of entities is not broached, however painful that may be. Therefore, it is obvious that Dodik does not wish to see BH meet the requirements to enter EU and NATO, and he is obstructing that process by pulling the subject of entities off the negotiating table. If this strategy is allowed to continue, the country’s reforms will ultimately fail, and it will not meet even the loosest criteria for the EU and NATO membership. Without that membership, the country will remain politically and economically isolated in the region and will ultimately fail. The political and economic stagnation - which ordinary Bosnians already find hard to bear - will become intolerable. The secessionists will have a field day tearing Bosnia and Herzegovina apart along ethnic – and entity – lines, and no one will seriously oppose them. The country will cease to exist in its present form and within the current borders, unless it becomes a member of EU and NATO.

Dodik’s ultimate goal of disabling BH’s reforms and sentencing the country to failure is not hard to recognize. In fact, Dodik openly states that he – and the majority of his RS citizens – dreams of Republika Srpska joining Serbia proper. He uses this nationalist claim to counteract any discussion of reforming entities, frequently stating that the citizens of Republika Srpska deserve a referendum on independence, as exercised by Montenegrins, for example.

IC’s Current Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina

Even though it is hard to state that the international community’s representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina have a common strategy for this country, certain common traits can be observed between the efforts of OHR, NATO, EUFOR, EU Commission, OSCE and key embassies (US and UK). All of these institutions support the Bosnian statehood and its present borders. They vociferously oppose any talk of referendums of secession in Republika Srpska and emphasize the need for country’s reforms in order to start negotiations on joining EU and NATO – strategic partnerships that would guarantee BH’s security, economic growth, and stability.

The majority of non-Serb citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina support these goals. They wish to see the country as a unified state that is part of the larger European family. However, the international community’s methods of reaching these goals have hardly set Bosnia and Herzegovina on the right track. Each effort – police, military, education, public TV/Radio reform – has been met with a serious opposition by the RS leadership. Only compromises that Dodik and other RS politicians have been willing to accept are the ones that do not make any significant changes to the present system and do not jeopardize Republika Srpska’s legitimacy and authority.

The international community does not have a strategy to deal with this opposition. This inability to pass reforms will cause the failure of the process that would guarantee the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina. What can be done?

Options

The international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina essentially has three options for its continued involvement.

The first option is to follow Schwarz-Schilling’s recommendation of radically reducing its involvement in the country’s affairs. This will cause the reform processes to come to a complete halt (we are almost at that point). Bosnian Serbs will veto any meaningful reform and will continue to work on economic and political stagnation of the state - while strengthening their entity – and wait for an opportunity to secede. Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats would be undoubtedly tempted to use their population majority – as they did in a 1992 referendum which proclaimed Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence from Yugoslavia – to pass reforms and continue pushing toward the EU and NATO membership. As in 1992, Bosnian Serbs would use these developments to legitimize their secessionist aspirations. The country would be faced with a referendum of Republika Srpska’s independence that would be followed by a Bosnian Croat referendum for a separate entity or full independence from the government in Sarajevo, despite open objections from Zagreb (Zagreb is too close to EU and NATO memberships to risk it with complicity in BH’s dissolution).

In such an environment, the possibility of a renewed conflict would be elevated to an almost certain outcome. The international community would have to face a choice of either allowing the conflict to take place; to stop it militarily at huge costs; or to present the Sarajevo government with a de facto recognition of new borders by quickly recognizing the newly-formed states. This outcome would go against everything that the international community has strived for and would provide the ultimate legitimization of the ethnic cleansing that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995.

Even though this outcome is not favorable for most Bosnians and the majority of international diplomats, it will at least stop the status quo agony that keeps Bosnian residents prisoners of an economically stagnant, divided, and futureless state.

The second option for the international community is to keep the level of involvement in Bosnian reforms at the same level. That primarily means restarting the negotiations on constitutional reforms. If the current format of such negotiations persists, the discussion of entity reforms will not take place. As a result, either meaningless reforms would be agreed upon and cheered as a major success, or the whole constitutional reform process would fail as it did in April 2006 because the reforms were largely cosmetic. In either case, Bosnian Serbs would buy more time from giving up the quasi-independence for Republika Srpska and hasten the demise of the BH statehood. The Bosnian Serb leadership is undoubtedly willing to continue this game of negotiating but not giving up any concessions as long as it takes – until the international community gives up hopes for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina inside the EU and NATO families as other problem areas take precedence. This path might take longer, but Bosnia and Herzegovina would eventually face the same outcome as stated in option one. The country would fall apart unless an international peacekeeping force – similar to IFOR that entered BH in 1995 – re-entered the country. This military option would require a political plan for salvaging the Bosnian statehood, and, therefore, it is highly unlikely.

The last option for the international community is to continue spearheading the constitutional reforms that would involve the discussion of BH’s internal organization – specifically, the entities and cantons. If such a debate would take place, Bosnian Serbs would undoubtedly pose serious obstacles. They would almost certainly try to organize a referendum for an RS independence and take other measures to fight off assault on the Republika Srpska’s existence and autonomy. The international community would have to use its arsenal of political, diplomatic, financial, and, if necessary, military powers to overcome the resistance by the RS leadership. That may include removing political, police, and military leadership in RS, and facing demonstrations, protests, and other types of civic disobedience. If this path is chosen, the international community’s efforts must be conveyed as uniform, steadfast, and relentless. Bosnian Serbs must be assured that their identity and rights would not be jeopardized by accepting reforms that would lay foundation for EU and NATO membership. The message must be that a stronger BH state, based on civic rather than ethnic principles, would better serve all of its citizens. In order to begin that process, the international community must find leaders in Republika Srpska willing to negotiate substantive constitutional reforms (and there are such leaders but their voices are rarely heard!). Otherwise, the negotiations on how to make the BH state functional with leaders who openly state that they wish Republika Srpska part of Serbia, and who claim that their hearts truly lie across the Drina River, is contradicio in adjecto.

Conclusion

Bosnia and Herzegovina requires reforms almost in every functional area. The good news is that all sides – domestic and international – recognize the need for such reforms. Where they disagree is whether to run reforms on state or entity level. However, functional reforms - like education - will ultimately fail unless constitutional amendments redefine the role and authority of entities and cantons. As long as the entities persist in the present form and enjoy the current powers and autonomy, other reforms will fail in their purpose. The country will continue to be divided along ethnic lines and the bureaucratic apparatus will continue to grow, stifling any chance for an economic growth, better social benefits, and much needed state investment in infrastructure, economy, etc. The state will fail. That is what’s at stake.

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