The Economist on Georgia
May 17th, 2008 by jibs
Here is an article by The Economist on the recent tensions in Georgia’s conflict zones. A few remarks:
The article suggests that tensions in Abkhazia can be explained not by the apprehension of Georgia attacking Abkhazia, but quite the opposite — Russia’a attempt to re-establish control over the tiny Georgian controlled territory of Kodori Gorge.
In other words, it’s Russia that could be preparing for military adventure 
into Kodori gorge which “would humiliate, perhaps topple, Georgia’s pro-Western president, Mikheil Saakashvili.”
From the start, a very unlikely interpretation: Russia would not risk international attention to retake a tiny Kodori Gorge (basically a few villages) by force. What would be the urgency of that altogether? — Georgia has been in control of that territory for around 2 years now, and therefore it is unclear why the Russians would strike now — before the elections in Georgia.
If that were to happen, Saakashvili’s regime would be in fact bolstered if anything. The “toppling part” is simply out of question — how would that happen? What, angry crowds would demand back the Kodori Gorge villages and through chanting for Saakashvili’s resignation overthrow the regime?
On the other hand, if that attack were to take place, Saakashvili would rally both the international community and even those who bitterly oppose him under the call to unite in face of Russia’s open military aggression. Most political forces in Georgia would be likely to forget about their hatred towards Saakashvili (I think hatred is right word to describe a big part of the oppositions’ attitude towards the “pro-Western” Saakashvili, and not because he is pro-Western).
In fact many of Saakashvili loud (and mostly scandalous) accusations against Russia would gain credibility — even his claims that Russia masterminded the protest last November which was eventually brutally dispersed.
It is therefore unclear how the author of the article predicts that Russia plans to attack Kodori Gorge so as to topple the pro-Western Saakashvili.
Luckily, the author does mention that in less than a week from today, there will be parliamentary elections in Georgia.
The “war scenario” with Russia is a much talked about topic these days by the ruling National Movement. Saakashvili does not make a speech without lambasting Russia’s annexation of Georgia’s territory, suggesting that Russia is trying to revise world order by taking on Georgia. Although, during the January elections, Saakashvili praised himself for not using the anti-Russian rhetoric to win votes — it seems many things have changed in last few months.
Georgia’s Minister for Reintegration (previously called conflict resolution Ministry) went as far as thanking the French ambassador for helping Georgia avoid the war against Russia — quite absurd to hear the Georgian officials talking up the war with Russia.
Did Russia become Georgia’s size overnight? What about its military capability? For those who think about such a possibility, a few things should be clear: this would bring an end to pretty much everything positive over the last ten years in Georgia — it would kill the economy, scare investors, ruin the prospects of ever making peace with the separatist regimes and many other woes.
Besides, there is no urgency to start a suicide war with Russia — for what exactly? Yes, for sheltering the separatist regimes — but this would not resolve the conflicts even if Georgia were to beat Russians, Abkhaz and South Ossetians together. How would this improbable victory be sustained? A more complex view would be to come up with the plan to lure back the separatists by offering something that Russia can’t.
So what is with all the war mongering and predicting a war which Georgia should not be even thinking about? Human rights center in Georgia gives a partial explanation: in an open letter the organization kindly asks the authorities to stop creating an illusion of reclaiming Abkhazia before the elections and talking up the war scenario, which causes panic among the population and destroys prospects of resolving the conflicts peacefully.
The bottom line is that unless someone has completely lost his mind, there will be no war between Georgia and Russia. Much talk about this can win the elections, but certainly not improve the chances of resolving territorial conflicts.
And yes, getting back to the article by The Economist — it also calls to see if Saakashvili holds clean parliamentary elections. Only elections don’t get rigged in one day, usually the preceding months count too. Here is an interim report by the OSCE election mission: the situation is not as rosy as would meet the standards of Beacon of Democracy. But, if it weren’t for those Russians… maybe an article on the democratic shortcomings in Georgia would give the Georgian officials something else to think about? How about, how did Saakashvili close his eyes on grave election violations this January which he won, but came to power through protests against rigged elections 5 years ago. Notice, there is no Russia in this topic.
Richard Says
I can currently only think of two things that Georgia can realistically offer Abkhazia and South Ossetia that Russia can not: independence and recognition.
May 18th, 2008 at 4:13 pm
jibs Says
There could be other potential too, but, at the moment I also can’t think of how this can happen. At the same time, I am certain that if relations between Georgia and Russia somehow improve, the South Ossetian conflict could be resolved at a sway. We are talking about some 60,000 inhabitants of a very tiny territory, and besides, war was not as messy as in Abkhazia.
In other words, Russia is the key — but when you have almost weekly diplomatic scandals and talk about possible war (how absurd), the prospects of using the “Russian Key” are fast diminishing…
May 18th, 2008 at 9:13 pm
Richard Says
I disagree with you that the key to the resolution of the conflicts between Georgia and its breakaway republics lies with Russia. This is a that has been repeated ad nauseum by Georgian authority figures in the past, and has consistently shown itself to be a moot point. As a matter of fact, the key to the resolution of these conflicts lies not with Russia or any external powers (like the EU or NATO), but primarily within Georgia itself.
For example, if Georgians managed to swallow their pride, and consequently recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, those statelets would not in fact be forced to rely on Russia for their economic and security needs. Furthermore, in this situation, a confederation of equals between Georgia and the newly independent statelets might also be in order, in which the territorial integrity of Georgia would be preserved, and the return of the refugees could begin in earnest.
I do not see that this would be impossible for Georgia to achieve, seeing as even Serbia managed to let go of Montenegro as we all know. Admittedly, it has been a lot harder for Serbia to let go of Kosovo, and here I see clear parallels to the situation between Georgia and Abkhazia: in both the cases, the respective governments and intellectuals on the Serbian and Georgian side have managed, over the course of the last century, to cultivate a national myth based on the notion that Abkhazia and Kosovo are integral parts of Serbian and Georgian statehood and civilisation. It is this national myth that has to be dispelled if both countries want to solve the respective conflicts, move on, and further proceed on their desired course towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.
May 21st, 2008 at 11:30 pm
Richard Says
In the first paragraph it should of course be:
“This [the notion that Russia represents the solution to the resolution of the separatist conflicts] is an argument that has been repeated ad nauseum by Georgian authority figures in the past, and has consistently shown itself to be a moot point.”
May 21st, 2008 at 11:34 pm